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Developments on Aboriginal Title 
 
Professor Kent McNeil 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
Toronto, Canada 
 
A paper for the Indigenous Peoples of the Caribbean Conference, IMPACT Justice, 
Belize City, April 27-29, 2016 
 
I would like to thank the organizers of this conference, especially Arif Bulkan and 
Velma Newton, for inviting me to speak and welcoming me to Belize. 
 
Tom Berger has made my task much easier by presenting the philosophical and 
legal underpinnings for Indigenous land rights, and providing an introduction to 
the development of the doctrine of Aboriginal title in Canada. 
 
I am going to try to fill in some of the detail by drawing a composite picture of 
Indigenous rights in the four common law jurisdictions that I am familiar with, 
namely Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. 
 
I will also talk about the important 2014 decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia,1 where the Supreme Court of Canada issued a declaration of Aboriginal 
title for the very first time. 
 
At the outset, I would like to emphasize that Indigenous rights are not just rights to 
lands and resources – they include rights in relation to Indigenous law and 
governance authority. 
 
I am going to address three main issues: 
 
1.  The source and proof of Indigenous rights; 
2.  The content of Indigenous rights; and 
3.  Extinguishment and infringement of Indigenous rights. 
 
1. The Source and Proof of Indigenous Rights 
 
Source and proof are so intimately linked that they can be conveniently addressed 
together. 
                                                 
1 [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257. 
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In all four of the common law jurisdictions I am considering, Indigenous rights 
arise from occupation and use of land, usually at the time the British Crown 
acquired sovereignty (though the timeframe is different in United States – I’ll 
come back to that). 
 
As Justice Judson of the Supreme Court of Canada stated in 1973 in the Calder 
case, already referred to in Tom Berger’s talk, “when the settlers came, the Indians 
were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had 
done for centuries. This is what Indian title means”.2 
 
This is consistent with the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court, going all the 
way back to Chief Justice Marshall’s seminal decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh3 in 
1823.  This approach was affirmed in 1941 by Justice William O. Douglas in 
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad,4 and has been applied in numerous 
decisions of the U.S. Court of Claims in cases on appeal from the Indian Claims 
Commission.5 
 
The same approach, based on occupation and use, was applied by the High Court 
of Australia in Mabo v. Queensland6 in 1992, and more recently by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v. Ngati Apa.7 
 
However, the law in these four jurisdiction diverges somewhat on two questions, 
specifically: (1) What does occupation mean? and (2) What is the relevance of 
Indigenous law? 
 
In the United States, occupation refers to occupation of territory rather than land.  
In the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad case, for example, Justice Douglas said that 
Indian title existed over lands that constituted the “definable territory” of the 
claimant tribe.8 
 
                                                 
2 Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 328. 
3 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
4 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
5 See Michael J. Kaplan, “Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands” (2003) 
LEXSEE 41 American Law Reports Federal 425. 
6 (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. 
7 [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643 (C.A.). 
8 United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, above note 4 at 345. 
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This has meant that, as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Worcester v. 
Georgia9 in 1832, the Indian nations’ rights to the territories in their exclusive 
occupation include property rights – title to land – and governmental authority, 
sometimes described as residual sovereignty. 
 
So in the United States, Indian title and tribal sovereignty can be established by 
proof that an Indian nation was in exclusive occupation of a “definable territory” 
for a long time – occupation which could have originated after the territory became 
part of the United States. 
 
There is no requirement in the United States that the occupation be in accordance 
with the laws of the Indian nation – this is simply assumed because it is obvious 
that every Indian nation had laws in relation to lands and other matters.10  So proof 
of Indigenous law is not necessary to establish Indian title and tribal sovereignty in 
the United States. 
 
The adequacy of occupation is assessed in a culturally-appropriate way, taking into 
account the claimant nation’s way of life.  As Justice Baldwin stated in 1835 in 
Mitchel v. United States, Indian occupation “was considered with reference to their 
habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual 
possession as the cleared fields of the whites”.11 
 
Likewise in Canada, the source of Aboriginal title is exclusive occupation of land, 
though the occupation has to be established at the time of Crown assertion of 
sovereignty. 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, it was not clear 
whether Aboriginal title had to be proven in relation to specific sites, such as 
villages and fishing places, or could be claimed and proven on a territorial basis 
over a larger area.  
 
In her unanimous judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin adopted the territorial 
approach and applied it to declare Aboriginal title over a large area where the trial 
judge had found the Tsilhqot’in to be in exclusive occupation through their 
presence on the land and their use of it for hunting, fishing, and gathering natural 
resources. 
                                                 
9 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
10 This was acknowledged by Marshall C.J. in Johnson v. M’Intosh, above note 3. 
11 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 at 746 (1835). 
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Evidence of Tsilhqot’in law had also been presented at trial to demonstrate their 
control over the land, and the Supreme Court relied on this as well in concluding 
that their occupation was exclusive.  However, although proof of Indigenous law in 
relation to land can be used to help prove exclusive occupation, as was held by 
Chief Justice Lamer in the Delgamuukw case in 1997,12 Aboriginal title in Canada 
does not depend on Indigenous law. 
 
While accepting the territorial approach to Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
Chief Justice McLachlin did not acknowledge the residual sovereignty of the 
Indian nations in the way the U.S. Supreme Court has done ever since the 
decisions of Chief Justice Marshall in the 1820s and 1830s.  
 
However, the Supreme Court held in the Delgamuukw case that Aboriginal title is 
communal and that the title-holding community has decision-making authority 
over their lands.   In Campbell v. British Columbia,13 Justice Williamson of the 
B.C. Supreme Court held that this authority must be governmental in nature 
because a political structure is necessary for communal decisions to be made. 
 
But while accepting that Aboriginal titleholders have the authority to manage their 
lands, Chief Justice McLachlin did not specify in Tsilhqot’in Nation whether this 
authority is governmental or not. 
 
In New Zealand, in the leading case of Attorney-General v. Ngati Apa14 the Court 
of Appeal held in 2003 that the Maori had Aboriginal title to any lands occupied by 
them in accordance with Maori customs and usages at the time of Crown 
acquisition of sovereignty in 1840.  Maori customs include Maori law, though as 
long as lands were being exclusively used by the Maori in 1840, it seems that they 
would have title, without having to establish that title as a matter of Maori law. 
 
This can be contrasted with the situation in Australia, which is the real outlier 
among these four common law jurisdictions.  Apart from statute, there was no 
acknowledgement that the Indigenous peoples of Australia had any legal rights to 
the lands they traditionally occupied until the High Court’s momentous decision in 
Mabo v. Queensland15 in 1992. 
                                                 
12 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R 1010 at paras. 102, 148, 157. 
13 [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.). 
14 Above note 7. 
15 Above note 6. 
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That decision reversed two centuries of denial by ruling that the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia do have native title – as Aboriginal title is called there – to the 
lands that they occupied in accordance with their traditional laws and customs at 
the time of the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty. 
 
In the words of Justice Brennan that were incorporated into the Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth), section 223(1), native title “has its origin in and is given its content by 
the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the 
indigenous inhabitants of a territory.”16 
 
As a result, for the Indigenous peoples of Australia to prove native title they have 
to show not only that they were in occupation of the claimed lands, but also that 
they had rights to those lands by virtue of their own laws.17  The stringent test for 
native title in Australia is out of step with the requirements for Aboriginal title in 
the other three common law jurisdictions we have examined. 
 
In addition, it is inconsistent with the common law as developed in England over 
the centuries, whereby a person who is in exclusive occupation of land has title by 
virtue of that occupation as against anyone who cannot prove a better title, 
including the Crown.18 
 
I now want to turn to the second issue to be discussed – the content of Aboriginal 
title. 
 
2. The Content of Aboriginal Title 
 
In the United States, Aboriginal or Indian title is an all-encompassing right, 
entitling the title-holding nation to exclusive possession and use of the land and the 
benefit of the natural resources on and under it, including standing timber and 
minerals.19  As mentioned earlier, the territorial nature of this title means that it 
includes governmental authority.20 
                                                 
16 Ibid. at 58. 
17 See Members of the Yorta Yorta Community v. Victoria, (2002) 214 C.L.R. 422.  
18 For detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989). 
19 See United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 at 115-18 (1938); United States v. Klamath 
and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 at 122-23 (1938); Otoe and Missouria Tribe v. United States, 
131 F. Supp. 265 at 290-91 (1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 848 (1955); United States v. Northern 
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In Canada, Aboriginal title is also a right to exclusive possession and use of the 
land, including surface and subsurface resources, for whatever purposes the 
titleholders choose.21  Because Aboriginal title is a complete beneficial interest, the 
Crown’s underlying title has no beneficial content whatsoever.22 
 
However, unlike in the United States, there is an inherent limit on Aboriginal title 
in Canada – the lands can’t be used in ways that will substantially deprive future 
generations of Indigenous titleholders of the benefit of the land.23  There is thus a 
sustainability component to Aboriginal title that, in my opinion, would be well 
worth applying to all land in Canada. 
 
Not all Indigenous land rights in Canada amount to Aboriginal title.  There are also 
more limited, non-exclusive resource-use rights, such as site-specific hunting and 
fishing rights, that are subject to a different test for proof.24 
 
In New Zealand, exclusive Maori title is also all-encompassing, though most Maori 
title lands were either surrendered to the Crown or converted to Maori fee simple 
lands in the latter half of the 19th century.  As in Canada, it is also possible for the 
Maori to enjoy non-exclusive resource-use rights, when provided for by Maori 
customs and usages. 
 
Again, Australia is the exception where the content of native title is concerned.  
Because native title originates from and is defined by Indigenous laws and 
customs, the content of the title depends on those laws and customs.25  So if, for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Paiute Nation, 393 F. 2d 786 at 796 (1968); United States ex rel Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F. 2d 
638 at 642 (1986). 
20 See Worcester v. Georgia, above note 9; United State v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.544 at 557 (1975); 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 at 322-23 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
21 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, above note 12 at paras. 116-24; Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia, above note 1 at paras. 67, 73. 
22 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, above note 1 at paras. 70-71. 
23 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, above note 12 at paras. 125-32; Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia, above note 1 at paras. 74-75, 86. 
24 The test, established in R. v. Van der Peet, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 507, requires proof that the custom, 
practice or tradition on which the Aboriginal right is based was integral to the distinctive culture 
of the Indigenous people claiming the right at the time of contact with Europeans. 
25 Mabo v. Queensland, above note 6 at 58; Native Title Act, 1993 (Cth), s.223(1). 
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example, an Indigenous people had no laws and customs regarding subsurface 
resources, their native title would not extend to mineral rights.26 
 
The Australia approach to the content of native title rights involves a strict 
application of what is known as the doctrine of continuity.  That doctrine provides 
that any property rights enjoyed under a pre-existing legal regime continue after 
the Crown acquires sovereignty.  However, as applied in Australia, the approach 
ignores the significance of exclusive occupation, which as we have seen is the 
basis for all-encompassing Indigenous land rights in Canada and the United States. 
 
Finally, in all four jurisdictions there is a restriction on alienation of Indigenous 
land title.  In Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, it can only be surrendered to 
the Crown.  In the United States, it can only be surrendered to the U.S. 
government. 
 
3. Extinguishment and Infringement of Indigenous Rights 
 
The question here is the extent to which Aboriginal title in particular is protected 
against extinguishment or infringement. 
 
There are three potential sources of protection: (1) the common law; (2) 
constitutional provisions; and (3) statutory provisions.  I am going to leave aside 
statutory provisions, which are too specific for my overview. 
 
Aboriginal title is a property right, and as such it enjoys the same common law 
protection as any property right.  Intruders who enter Aboriginal title land without 
permission are trespassers, and the Aboriginal titleholders have the same remedies 
as other land owners: they can employ self-help to remove the trespassers, or they 
can go to court and get an injunction and damages.27 
 
The government, as the upholder of the rule of law, is obliged to use its authority 
to protect the property rights of Indigenous peoples.  This also means that the 
government itself cannot take or infringe these rights unless it has statutory 
authority to do so.  Ever since Magna Carta in 1215, property rights have been 
                                                 
26 Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1. 
27 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, above note 1 at para. 90, Chief Justice McLachlin stated that, “[a]fter 
Aboriginal title to land has been established by court declaration or agreement, … [t]he usual 
remedies that lie for breach of interests in land are available”. She was referring there to 
remedies against the Crown, but a fortiori the usual remedies against third parties would also be 
available. 
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protected against executive taking or infringement,28 and this protection extended 
to Indigenous property rights when overseas territories were colonized by the 
Crown.29 
 
However, the common law does not protect property rights against legislative 
taking or infringement.  Legislatures acting within their constitutional authority can 
enact statutes that authorize the taking or infringement of property rights, as long 
as the intention to do so is clearly and plainly expressed in the legislation.30  
Expropriation statutes, permitting the taking of private property for public 
purposes, are examples.  But payment of compensation is required, unless 
expressly denied by the statute.31 
 
Although the common law does not protect property rights against legislative 
taking and infringement, constitutions do provide such protection in some 
jurisdictions.  Of the other four jurisdictions I am considering, the United States 
and Australia do have constitutional provisions protecting property rights 
generally. 
 
The 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall 
not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
 
Now remarkably, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1955 in the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians32 
case held that Indian title is not property that is protected by the 5th Amendment. 
One justification given was that Indian title is more in the nature of sovereignty, 
which relates to the jurisdictional dimension of Indian title that I mentioned earlier. 
 
                                                 
28 See Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508 at 569 (H.L.); Burmah Oil 
Co. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L.); A.G. v. Nissan, [1970] A.C. 179 (H.L.). 
29 See Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria, [1921]  2 A.C. 399 (P.C.); Eshugbayi Eleko 
v. Government of Nigeria, [1931] A.C. 662 (P.C.). 
30 See Newcastle Breweries Ltd. v. The King, [1920] 1 K.B. 584; Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner 
Valley Gas Conservation Board, [1933] S.C.R. 629; A.G. Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ltd., [1952] 
A.C. 427 (P.C.); Colet v. R., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 2 at 10; Clunies-Ross v. The Commonwealth (1984) 
155 C.L.R. 193 (H.C. Aust.). 
31 See Western Counties Railway Co. v. Windsor and Annapolis Railway Co. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 
178 at 188 (P.C.); Commissioner of Public Works (Cape Colony) v. Logan, [1903] A.C. 355 at 363-
64 (P.C.); Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd., [1919] A.C. 744 at 
752 (H.L.); De Keyser's Royal Hotel, above note 28 at 542, 576, 579. 
32 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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However, I think the real basis for this decision was political and economic: the 
Supreme Court wanted Congress to have discretion to deal with the Indian tribes as 
it thought best without being subject to constitutional protections for property. 
 
In Australia, section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution provides that any taking of 
property by Parliament has to be on “just terms”, but this provision does not apply 
to state legislatures and so has provided little protection to Indigenous land rights. 
 
Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights do enjoy significant constitutional 
protection in Canada.  In 1982, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was added to 
our Constitution, providing important protections for civil rights.  At the same 
time, section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, was added.  It provides that “[t]he 
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed.”  A large body of case law has since grown up around 
section 35, which I don’t have time to even summarize. 
 
But briefly, the Supreme Court of Canada has held, first of all, that as a 
consequence of section 35 Aboriginal rights, including title, can no longer be 
extinguished unilaterally by legislation.33  Aboriginal title can only be surrendered 
with the consent of the Indigenous titleholders, for example in a modern land 
claims agreement. 
 
The Supreme Court has nonetheless held that, despite section 35, Aboriginal rights 
can still be infringed by or pursuant to legislation, provided the infringement can 
be justified by the government on a strict test. 
 
Briefly, the government must prove that there is a valid legislative objective behind 
the legislation, which usually isn’t hard to do.  But that is just the first part of the 
test.  The second part requires the government to prove that it has respected the 
Crown’s fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal people by (1) consulting with them 
about the proposed infringement; (2) infringing the right as little as possible; and 
(3) paying compensation for the economic impact of the infringement. 
 
So although justifiable infringement is theoretically possible, in reality 
governments should negotiate with Aboriginal rights holders and get their consent 
to actions that will impact negatively on their rights.34 
                                                 
33 R. v. Van der Peet, above note 24 at para. 28; Mitchell v. MNR, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at para. 
11. 
34 See Tsilhqot’in Nation, above note 1 at para. 76. 
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The most significant development in Aboriginal rights law in Canada in the past 12 
years has been the Supreme Court’s imposition on governments of a duty to 
consult with Indigenous peoples, even when their rights have not yet been 
established.35  This duty arises when their claimed rights could be negatively 
affected by government action, such as authorization of resource development, 
including mining and harvesting of forests. 
 
As long as the Indigenous people concerned have a credible claim, even though not 
yet proven in court, and the government is aware of that claim, consultation has to 
take place before any action that would have a potential negative impact on the 
claimed rights can go ahead.  While this does not give Indigenous peoples a veto 
over resource development, it does make them players and give them considerable 
clout in negotiating benefits for their communities. 
 
As I have said, this duty to consult is in relation to claimed but unproven rights.  
Where rights have been proven, as in the case of the Tsilhqot’in people in British 
Columbia who had their Aboriginal title recognized by the Supreme Court a couple 
of years ago, consent is almost always going to be required.  As the Supreme Court 
said in the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision, consent can only be dispensed with if the 
government can meet the justifiable infringement test.36  And as I noted earlier, this 
will rarely be possible. 
 
Moreover, in Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Supreme Court said that, even if justified, 
infringements can’t substantially diminish the benefit of the land for future 
generations.37  So the sustainability restriction on Aboriginal title applies to 
governments as well as to the titleholders themselves. 
 
As a result, where Aboriginal title has been established, Canada will almost 
invariably have to obtain the “free, prior and informed consent” of the Indigenous 
people concerned before taking action that might impact their rights.  This is 
required both by Canadian law and by the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (e.g. Articles 19 and 28). 
 
                                                 
35 This duty was first articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R 511, and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 550, and has been applied in numerous decisions at all levels of courts across the country 
since then. 
36 Tsilhqot’in Nation, above note 1 at para. 90. 
37 Ibid. at para. 86. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Our comparison of Indigenous rights in the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand has revealed many similarities, but also some major differences, 
especially where Australia is concerned. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has gone the furthest in acknowledging extensive land 
rights and residual sovereignty, but has denied constitutional protection to 
Indigenous land rights.  In Canada, land rights equivalent to those of the Indian 
nations in the United States have been recognized and given constitutional 
protection, but the Supreme Court has not yet expressly acknowledged the 
jurisdictional dimensions of these rights. 
 
The High Court of Australia has taken the most restrictive approach to Indigenous 
rights, using the doctrine of continuity to limit their scope and denying the 
Indigenous peoples any governmental authority.  In New Zealand, Indigenous land 
rights that have not been converted to common law interests can be as extensive as 
in the United States and Canada, but they do not enjoy any constitutional 
protection against legislation. 
 
After initially voting against it, these four settler states have now adopted the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. What has yet to be determined is 
the impact the Declaration will have on their domestic laws.  If they are serious 
about implementing it, significant adjustments to their legal systems will no doubt 
need to be made.  I expect that future developments in Indigenous rights will 
happen as governments and courts begin to take the terms of the Declaration 
seriously. 
